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PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF FINANCIAL MARKETS IN
NORTH AMERICA
John F. M. Creant
Canadian Speaker
I feel a little bit overwhelmed by this group of people, professional
lawyers with deep experience, and people in the policy information area.
Those of you who are Canadian will recognize that the Canadian bankers do
not have a very good track record of success in the policy area. In areas
pertaining to things that are near and dear to us like bank mergers, we have
been singly unsuccessful in getting any effective policy. That also goes for a
whole series of things that we as bankers have been advocating. So, it is with
some trepidation that I stand here in front of you to talk about policy.
It kind of reminds me of that pair of balloonists who were floating over
the Californian hills on a lovely sunny summer's day, like we are going to
have in a couple of weeks' time. They had gone through their champagne,
and they kind of lost track. They noticed when they looked over the basket
that the clouds had come in, and they did not know where they were. So they
let some gas out and floated down. As they came through the clouds, there on
the hill was a solitary man walking. They called down to him, "Can you tell
us where we are?" He looked up. "You are in a balloon." The one balloonist
said to the other, "That man down there, he is a banker." The other guy was a
little taken back by this and said, "How do you know he is a banker?" He
replied without thinking, "What he said was totally accurate, and it was
absolutely irrelevant."
With that, I will talk a little bit about some of the things that I have seen
in both the U.S. jurisdictions and the Canadian about integrity and financial
markets in North America. I should probably begin by squaring the title,
which talks about preserving, because really what we have seen is quite a
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strain of corporate malfeasance over the last few years; earlier examples like
Safety-Kleen through Enron, and now most recently HealthSouth.'
CORPORATE DISCLOSURES
From a historical perspective, I think it is, correct to say that the extent
and accuracy of disclosure by corporations today has been as good as it ever
has been. I would say it is getting an awful lot better. There is a strain, no
doubt, of malpractice. I would argue that while it is deep, it is relatively
narrow. That does not make it any easier to deal with, because in fact, you
have a very large community out there of very honest people who work
extraordinarily hard not only to comply with the laws, but to comply with the
spirit of good disclosure.
The issue has been tackled in an extremely vigorous fashion. In the U.S.,
we have had Sarbanes-Oxley.2 This is a very good set of conference
materials, which I commend you on. I spent at least five hours working
through it. I would like to suggest for my colleague, Michael, that you go to
page four of seven in the tab that applies to this. The U.S. Government has
given the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) an absolutely
intractable legislative obligation. If you look in the second paragraph, the
SEC is directed to report to Congress on item two, whether generally
accepted accounting practices (GAAP) clearly conveys to investors the
economics of off balance sheet transactions. I will suggest to you that there is
no way that the SEC in today's state of accountancy and managing
reporting is in any kind of position to fulfill that legislative obligation.
There are lots of new things happening. Sarbanes-Oxley has the
accounting profession busily looking to see how they can correct their
deficiencies in the real base accounting requirements. This is happening both
in Canada and the U.S. 3 As a practicing businessman, I can assure you that
the level of scrutiny that the accountancy professionals are given has
dramatically increased. The fact that Arthur Andersen went down has
focused their minds in a way they have not been focused in a long time.
While in Canada we have had fewer examples of bad reporting, let me just
remind you of Bre-Ex and Laidlaw, and suggest that we have not been

1 Stephen Taub, Ex-Safety-Kleen CFO chargedwith fraud, CFO.coM, Dec. 13, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 10705320; Leigh Page, Now healthcare has its Enron: HealthSouth's
physician partners face some difficult choices as investigators continue to expose the
company 'sfinances, MOD. PHYSICIAN, May 1, 2003, available at 2003 WL 2248259.
2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor
Protection Act), PuB.L. 107-204, July 30, 2002, 116 Stat. 745.
3 Sarbanes- Oxley and CorporateGovernance Reform Top of Mind with CanadianBanks
in 2003, CAN. NEWSWIRE, April 22, 2003.
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untouched, and ought not to expect that in Canada we will continue to be
untouched.4
The burden of my remarks is to suggest that while these steps are all good
and go in the right direction in solving our problems of integrity, they will
not be sufficient. There is intense fervor; just read the Wall Street Journal,
Barron's, the New York Times, or any other business press. People are very
seized with this problem and think that we need to reform things. 5 It is a long
and difficult road that I believe we are embarked upon.
Fervor is good at the beginning, but we cannot count on that to give us the
necessary gas. This has got to be a long-term exercise, particularly in three
areas. First, the North American accounting profession is going to have to
recognize that it can no longer rely on purely a rules based regime. It will
have to move to a principles based regime. I will talk about that in a minute.
Secondly, new financing techniques like off balance sheet, special purpose
vehicles, swap options, and the like have fundamentally shifted the way in
which risk can be managed. The accounting techniques as well as the
techniques for enforcement, insurance, and compliance have a long way to
go before they catch up with these. Finally, we need to have corporate
governance significantly changed.
Let me start with a couple of observations. First of all, failure is normal.
In this world, both in the business and private sector, we will always have
failure. Industries go through cycles. Over time, some of them go out of
existence. I know that from personal experience. My family was in the hat
business. Hats are a classic example of a business gone completely out of
existence. If you look back historically there are many examples. Steam is
another. Steam as a means of propulsion, has completely disappeared. We
are clearly going to see industries change over time. Even within successful
industries in a world of high competition, individual companies go out of
business. The business cycle, which we have not yet tamed, is itself going to
bunch the timings of failure. This ongoing presence of failure conditions the
whole debate.
Second, we live in a world of deception. While companies in preparing
their financial reports always enjoy significant gray areas for accounting,
recording of their income, and valuing their assets and liabilities nobody
should be surprised that most executives put a little bit of a gloss on the
results. They shade them. They may move their income up or move it down.
Income smoothing has not been unknown, except for the Bank of Nova
4 No simple way to prevent another Busangscam, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 4, 1998,

available at 1998 WL 16652742; Laidlaw, Inc., HOOVER'S COMPANY PROFILES, July 5, 2003,
availableat 2003 WL 60222068.
5 Alan Murray, Case Study: Turmoil at AOL Shows Need For Wider Changes,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2003, at A4, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3957024.

CANADA-UNITED STATES LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 29:281

Scotia. Nobody should be surprised that we have executives who put a good
gloss on reports, nor should we be surprised that these practices on occasion
slide into something more sinister.
Management firms undergoing financial distress face particularly acute
temptations to paper over problems, which they believe will prove to be
temporary. In my experience as a banker, I have rarely found a company that
files for insolvency where we do not find after the fact that the accounts have
been moved in a way that obscures the true extent of the underlying
problems. I do not think we should, therefore, be all that surprised at the
amount of fraud that is floated to the top in this period of economic
difficulty.
Let me begin in talking about the approach to correcting these problems
with accounting rules. The U.S, and largely Canadian, accounting
professions believe that the way to go about accounting is to institute very
detailed rules. 6 These are almost Byzantine in their complexity. Debacles
such as Enron have demonstrated the detailed prescriptive accounting rules
are not in themselves sufficient to prevent fraud. Indeed, it is my proposition
that their very prescriptive nature can be used by the unscrupulous as a road
map to find ways of presenting results which conform to the detailed rules
that present a misleading picture. As one of my great friends and workups
used to put it, "It tells the truth in an untruthful fashion."
The proper approach to solving this problem is not the elaboration of
further rules to fix the loopholes that unscrupulous management of yesterday
managed to unearth. In my view, it is the enunciation of the common sense
objectives that lie behind each of the various rules, or sets of rules, that the
accountancy profession has. The problem with common sense, as Voltaire
says, is it is not common enough. When you try to put it down on paper you
get enormous argument about how you formulate that common sense. It is
not the sort of thing that accountants like to do. They like to deal in
certainties and so it really does run against a lot of the training. If we do not
have that principles based type of accounting, we are going to run the risk of
having more and more Enrons.
If you do have the principles, I propose to you as lawyers, that those
principles will make enforcement easier. Because when the unscrupulous
CFO puts together an SPV that meets the details of the rule, you have
something that is of a nature of generalized anti-avoidance, to use a Canadian
taxation principle, and you can nail them on the fact that he has clearly
violated what is the common sense underlying principle we hope has been
enunciated for this standard. Let me give you an illustration, because all that
See generally, William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and Accounting: Rules
Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1023 (2003).
6
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is very fluffy. I am going to take a Canadian example of a prescriptive
standard, which illustrates a couple of examples.
DIFFICULTIES IN VALUING LOANS
In the financial sector, one of the most difficult areas is valuing loans on
the books of a bank. We will first look at commercial loans. There are two
types of difficulties in valuing commercial loans. One has to do with the
borrower; whether the borrower is likely to pay back that loan according to
its terms. The other has to do with a condition of the lending institution
itself. Take the borrower first. We in Canada are blessed with a bunch of
accountants who have given us rule 3025, a highly specific rule telling us
how to do our loans. If there is any doubt about collection, you have got to
do a detailed cash flow quarter by quarter, lay out all the underlying
assumptions for this cash flow of collections discounted at a rate that is
probably irrelevant to any fundamental economics but is a prescribed rate,
and then come up with a calculation of the value of this loan. The difference
between that, the book value, and the last quarter is the quantum of your loss.
It looks very precise. I can tell you we produce great books of this stuff every
quarter. The problem is that the precision is largely spurious. When you look
at it, particularly for the junior people in the accountancy firms and the credit
areas and audit areas, the precision is seductive and you can easily miss the
degree of judgment that is involved. That in itself is a problem.
In my view, one of the most fundamental changes in bank accounting is
coming through the Basel Group of Supervisors, which is the Fed, the FSE,
the U.K., and the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institution in
Canada, and so on around the developed world.8 These regulators have
effectively brought a principle-based approach to accounting for commercial
loans. 9
One of the keys to that is back tasking. Each institution each quarter has
to look at its loan losses and back task to what it said a quarter ago, a year
ago, and what the loan's losses were going to be. Through this process, you
get much more of a sense of how well the internal processes of that
institution are working. If the Basal standard ultimately gets passed as it is
forecast to do in a couple of years, they will require the disclosure of the
7 Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, CICA Handbook, s. 3025, Impaired Loans
8 The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), Fact Sheet: Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, available at www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/eng/issues/basel-e.asp.
Established in 1974 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is comprised of
representatives from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.

9 See generally, SOUND PRACTICES FOR LOAN ACCOUNTING AND DISCLOSURE, BASEL
COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION (July 1999), available at www.bis.org/publ/bcbs55.pdf
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institution's internal management processes.1 l That is a good thing. It flies
very much against the rules-based standard of the accountants today, but it
gives you an example of the sorts of standards that you can get when you go
to principles.
The second set of difficulties in valuing commercial portfolios relates to
internal control standards of a company. This applies not only to banks, it
also applies to any company. For those of you who read the article Tuesday
in the Wall Street Journal on Health South, on how the accountants missed
the fraud there; it is very easy to lay out a series of risk based criteria that lets
you get yourself to an evaluation of whether or not that management is
producing good accounting records." We had a stunning example in Canada
a few years ago, a company called Royal Trust, which got into some
difficulty. It had been an AAA rated company, lending fairly aggressively in
the mortgage area, when got into some trouble. Frankly, we did not know
how deep its troubles were. We went in looking, we and the Royal Bank,
were looking at a potential bid for the company. 2 We used our most senior
real estate lending people to go in and look at the portfolios. In many cases,
we knew the actual borrowers and the loans. In quite a few cases, we had
actually turned them down, I am happy to say. We were able to evaluate the
losses that were on their books that they did not know about. I think it was in
the neighborhood of $600 million, not far off the quantum that was actually
recognized by the company. The reason we were able to get at that was
because we had people on the ground in the field that were able to very
quickly bring that information out in evaluating the loans.
Notice, Chartered Accountants do not have this access, because they are
not in the marketplace. The best that they can do is be the regulators. The
Fed, in particular, who look across whole industries and compare across
banks are positioned to do this, but chartered accountants are not. They
cannot share information about their clients. It is not surprising that you find
accountancy firms who miss the valuation of loans, not because of bad
management, but because of information they do not have.
SPOTTING EARLY WARNING SIGNS
That gets us to the types of early warning information that needs to be put
in place. The accountancy profession has come some way in the last few
10 See generally, THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD: THIRD CONSULTATIVE PAPER, BASEL
COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION (April 29, 2003) available at www.bis.org/bcbs/
bcbscp3.htm
1 Surgery Partners of HealthSouth Mull Bailing Out, WALL ST. J., April 8, 2003, at BI
available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3964184.
12 Jade Hemeon, Royal Trust finds a buyer Royal Bank to take over ailingfirm for $1.6
billion, TORONTO STAR, March 19, 1993, at DI, availableat 1993 WL 7246288.
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years. However, as that discussion in the Wall Street Journal indicated a
couple of days ago, accountancy firms are not yet responding to these early
warning signs.
One of the big problems, quite frankly, is that accountants are not trained
in failure. I meet a lot of the young people that come into the bank to do both
corporate and commercial lending, chartered accountants, MBAs, and I ask
how many of you have had any experience or teaching in failure. None of
them have. They worry about successful companies and they learn how to
value things according to very careful rules. But in getting any sense of the
early warning signs, very few of them have it. I think one of the most
important things the profession has to do is to begin to put together a much
better understanding of these early warning signs and move this information
out to their field officers.
That brings me to off balance sheet transactions, swaps, and so on. These
have been marketed as ways of avoiding or insuring against risks. Swaps can
do that. Off balance sheet transactions can do that. The problem with them is
that they can also be used to create risk and most frequently fragment risk, so
that becomes very difficult to follow. At the risk of boring people on a lovely
Saturday afternoon, let me give you a couple of quick examples.
A lot of companies, probably quite a few of your clients - the more
financially challenged clients, have sold their receivables. It is a very
frequent technique. It is a nice technique because it makes the financial
ratios of the company look better, usually lowers the cost of capital, and
generally is well accepted in the marketplace. The problem with it is that in
most cases, it is done with the company remaining as the collection agent of
the receivable. They also keep a small portion, five to ten percent of the
receivable, against which the first losses are charged. You rarely have more
than five percent loss on receivables. If they sell 95 cents of every dollar of
receivables and keep five cents, that receivables purchase vehicle has not
bought any risk at all. All the risk has remained on the books of the company
that sold them.
There is no way that the financial position of this company has improved
even though the ratios look better. We in banking insist whenever that has
happened that the company tells us how much of this residual risk remains.
We call it toxic waste. We either add back the full amount of the receivable
financing onto the balance sheet for financial calculation purposes or we
deduct that residual receivable from the equity. Either way, it gives you the
same result, but it also produces liquidity risk.
Liquidity risk, in this example, happens because the financial covenants in
the SPV are typically much tighter than the company has in its own
borrowing. When there is a problem with the company, the SPV hits a
trigger; the receivables are forced to run off. As they are collected, the SPV
is paid out. The poor company now has to finance all its receivables on its
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own balance sheet and does not have the resources to do it. Frequently, that
is the trigger that brings these companies down. I defy you as an investor
through most of the accounting that you see, to get a good sense of how great
this risk is, either the residual collection risk or the liquidity risk.
I have a section here that deals with swaps and off balance sheet
vehicles. Let me just refer to long-term capital. It is not widely recognized
how long-term capital actually came to a failure. Long-term capital got into
trouble not because the swaps and options did not work. In fact, they worked
incredibly well. The math and the statistics were really stunningly good. The
problem was that the management of that company thought they were better
than they really were. Based on incorrect information they borrowed too
much money; the leverage was too high.
Secondly, there was an imbalance in their liquidity given the peculiarities
of the contracts. When you had a significant price move, as long-term capital
had post collateral and they did not get any from the banks, they simply ran
out of liquidity. The long-term cap merely came undone. In their last few
days, they borrowed from a line with a bunch of other banks and the banks
got into a fight as to whether there had been a default. If the banks had declared a default it would have crossed defaulted into all of the contracts and
the long-term cap would have gone.
The banks called a vote on that bank syndication agreement. They needed
a two-thirds to do a vote of non-default. The large commercial banks in New
York are going to put the rest of the money in insisted on a positive vote.
The American banks in that syndicate were hung. There was a foreign bank.
If that foreign bank had not gone along and voted in favor of non-default,
long-term cap would have gone. I can tell you that there were a number of
very panicked phone calls from the most senior levels. My illustration of that
is that the accounting rules are insufficient to tell us these risks. We have to
get to a much more effective illustration of the risks underlying these
portfolios if we are going to have good and full disclosure.
Canadians think that they have a much better system. I would tell you
that Royal Trust on three occasions was within a hair's breath of failing on
liquidity and failed payments. We came within a hair's breath of an even
more dangerous failure. So, it is an issue on both sides of the border.
Just one quick word on management. I am all in favor of all of these
moves to make sure that boards are more accountable. They need the tools.
The key tools are changes in internal management and accountancy rules.
Without that, the boards will not be in a position to be able to play the rules.
I do not think it is sufficient for accountancy firms simply to walk away.
They have to be able to be held accountable for the fairness of their
disclosure. With a lack of the standards, I come back to where I first started.
The SEC is without the tools to fulfill its mandate of assuring the President
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that the GAAP will allow the SEC to fulfill its mandate. Thank you very
much.

